Despite growing recognition that authoritarianism can be far more durable than transition theorists previously expected, transition theory assumptions continue to constrain attempts to understand authoritarian regimes. In particular, alternative avenues of political participation to opposition political parties and electoral contests are under examined. Singapore's authoritarian regime involves a range of such innovative institutional and ideological initiatives, one of the most significant being the Nominated Members of Parliament scheme. This promotes notions of representation different from democratic parliamentary representation which are not without appeal to targeted, emerging social forces. Singapore's political economy dynamics contribute to this responsiveness by obstructing independent power bases.
Introduction
After decades of transition theorists' preoccupation with when, how and why transformations to liberal democracy occur, the inability of this framework to anticipate or understand the enduring and dynamic nature of authoritarian rule came under critical notice. 1 Yet as some writers respond to the challenge of taking the durability of authoritarianism more seriously, 2 the transition theory assumption about the analytical primacy of strategic choices of incumbent elites and focus on a comparatively narrow range of political institution persists.
So too does the failure to examine how inter-relationships between variables are influenced by dynamic power relations and interests associated with capitalist development. Even where analyses of institutional choices made by incumbent elites take greater account of the systemic effects of structural and historical factors, 3 this does not extend to a full recognition that conflicts and alliances rooted in political economy fundamentally shape how and where state power is exercised. 4 Consequently, while recent work from both these approaches significantly enhances our appreciation of the factors mediating the extent and impact of manipulation of elections and political parties within authoritarian regimes, it is not much interested in, nor able to adequately explain, the expansion of political participation through creative institutional and ideological alternatives to electoral competition.
Analytical bias towards elections and parties is explained by Gandhi on the basis that 'the institutional inventiveness of dictators is most apparent when they govern within nominally democratic institutions, such as legislatures and political parties,' 5 while Brownlee contends that elections 'are the autocrat's latest fashion.' 6 But while the incorporation of elections and parties into authoritarian strategies of cooption are undeniably important, whether this is the only fashion -or even the most important and inventive fashion -among
authoritarian regimes is open to challenge. New modes of political participation are increasingly emerging as alternatives to opposition parties and electoral competition in the strategies of authoritarian regime reproduction, from the world's most populous authoritarian regimes in China to one of the smallest in Singapore. This includes policy deliberations between authorities and citizens, deliberative budgeting procedures, as well as formal complaints and grievance mechanisms. 7 Jayasuriya and Rodan have argued that, through these innovative institutional developments, more political participation and less contestation can go hand in hand. 8 According to Geddes, 'Relatively few authoritarian regimes have hit upon a formula for successful and stable inclusionary authoritarianism.' 9 However, Singapore under the People's Action Party (PAP) certainly qualifies -both in terms of harnessing nominally democratic institutions and in creating new institutions outside and inside Parliament. For leaders of other authoritarian regimes seeking to ensure social changes ensuing from advanced capitalist development do not translate into effective pressures for political liberalization, the PAP experience offers encouragement, if not inspiration. Yet while Levitsky's and Way's depiction of Singapore as a 'façade electoral regime' where 'electoral institutions exist but yield no meaningful contestation for power' is descriptively accurate, it doesn't capture the institutional and ideological means by which political elites attempt to reproduce authoritarianism in Singapore have been changing, nor why this is happening. 10 An especially significant part of this process is the development of non-democratic structures and notions of representation. Gandhi argues that the presence of legislatures and parties within authoritarian regimes offers 'little in the way of representation and accountability to participants and ordinary citizens.' 11 However, it is not the objective of the PAP to institutionalize democratic representation and accountability but viable alternatives to Thailand -which has mobilized against two elected governments and supported a military coup against one -is pushing for a parliament that is 70 per cent appointed, a look at attempts to develop non-democratic notions of representation in Singapore has a wider practical and theoretical significance.
At one level, the NMP scheme gives new expression to a longstanding ideology of technocracy that previous analysts of the PAP have observed. Barr, 13 in particular, has already provided a rich account of how ruling elite rhetoric claiming reason, objectivity and the insulation of vested interests characterize processes at all levels of political and bureaucratic decision-making in Singapore. 14 Importantly, he points out that despite personal connections and privilege being intrinsic to the way that power is actually exercised, this legitimating ideology has serious traction because there is enough 'truth in the myths of meritocracy, elite governance and pragmatism to ensure that the city-state is stable and profitable.' 15 At another level, though, how the PAP is adapting and institutionalizing this ideology through new state-controlled modes of political participation is largely unexploredespecially as it involves ideas of representation. We now witness an attempt to more systematically embed the technocratic idea that politics is fundamentally a problem-solving exercise requiring logical solutions and expertise; not a struggle over normative goals.
The argument here is that the NMP scheme attempts to extend and reconcile technocratic ideas about governance, on the one hand, with a political objective of strategic inclusion of diverse and emerging social forces to pre-empt oppositional politics gaining from their concerns, on the other hand. In particular, representation is meant to structure political participation in such a way as to bypass or control intermediary organizations and, in so doing, limit the sorts of conflicts permissible in the political process. This new phase in authoritarianism, and the prospects of it achieving ruling party goals, must be understood in relation to Singapore's dynamic political economy -not least the consolidation and extension of state capitalism, which has helped entrench interests served by a technocratic ideology and militated against new independent economic and social bases for political opposition. The scope for political cooption, reflected in the growing appeal of the NMP scheme -especially among the professional middle class -and some tensions it generates within the PAP itself reflect this structural context.
Authoritarian Consensus and the NMP Rationale
The stirrings of a refinement to the authoritarian regime in Singapore were first in evidence by the early 1980s following a 12. NMPs are appointed by the President for terms of up to two-and-half years on the advice of a Special Select Committee appointed by Parliament. 19 In contrast with elected MPs, they cannot vote on money bills, bills to alter the Constitution, or motions of no confidence in the government. However, they can speak on these issues and vote and speak on any other bills and motions. Even among government MPs, the scheme initially proved contentious when it was introduced as a parliamentary bill in November 1989. Indeed, in order to allay concerns within its own ranks, the government's bill required that each new Parliament would have to approve the continuation of the appointment of NMPs. Yet not only has that approval been secured without exception thereafter, but in 1997 the number of NMPs allowed for was increased from the original maximum of six to up to nine.
In explaining the need for NMPs, Prime Minister Goh sought to address what he saw as a public misconception that the PAP was closed to alternative points of view on policy. It was clear that he didn't consider the views advanced through opposition political parties as valuable to policy deliberations. NMPs were therefore intended to be non-partisan and 'concentrate on the substance of the debate rather than the form and rhetoric'. 20 The legislation altering the Constitution referred to 'independent and non-partisan views' in the selection criteria for NMPs. 21 Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong also expressed the hope that NMPs would help arrest the increasing support for opposition candidates. 
Absorbing Social Interests
Since the first two appointments of NMPs to Parliament in 1990, the scheme has expanded significantly to involve 48 different people and a total of 59 appointments, with some NMPs serving more than one term. The complexion of appointments suggests they have been intended to both supplement existing mechanisms of political co-option, particularly in regard to labour and ethnic minorities, and to provide avenues for absorbing emerging social forces among business and middle classes associated with Singapore's advanced capitalist development. The scheme has also proven to be a dynamic one, with shifts in the emphasis of appointments reflecting changing PAP perceptions on the forces and issues warranting political accommodation or engagement.
In an attempt to capture the chief characteristics and dynamics of the various NMP appointments since the beginning of the scheme in June 1990 through to the eleventh Parliament beginning in November 2006, Table 1 identifies these on the basis of interest groups or sectors. The individuals involved can generally be depicted as principally belonging to one or other interest group or sector, but many straddle these categories. This would appear to be a strategy by the Parliamentary Select Committee responsible for the appointments to simultaneously incorporate or address different target interest groups and sectors. Bracketed figures refer to the cross-categorizations of NMPs and are additional to un-bracketed primary categorizations.
Note also that some NMPs have been appointed in more than one Parliament so they are counted for each Parliament.
One of the striking themes has been a sustained bias towards inclusion of people from the professions and academia, with medical and legal professionals especially prominent. What is especially significant in these appointments is the repeated incorporation of senior past or present figures from within peak employer and business bodies. 25 Historically, the PAP was apprehensive about the potential the domestic private sector represented for an independent political base that might be exploited by political opponents. 26 Yet while state capitalism may have subsequently eroded that potential capacity, Among the most fascinating appointments are those in the three categories in Table 1 of Women, Societal and Ethnicity, since these have been the areas involving embryonic civil society organizations. The number of appointments principally to incorporate 'constituents' under these categories has not been substantial, but they have been strategic. Moreover, when we take into account crossover with other appointments it becomes clear that the Select Committee has been keen to project the idea that the concerns and interests of advocacy groups can be accommodated through the NMP scheme.
The appointment of orthopedic surgeon Kanwaljit Soin to the eighth Parliament was a conspicuous attempt to encourage activists within the feminist Association of Women for Action and Research (AWARE) towards direct engagement within a PAP-controlled institution. Soin was a founding member and President of AWARE, which was established in 1985 as a genuinely independent organization seeking to influence public opinion and policy.
Whilst its reform agenda has been moderate, its independence and preparedness to focus on issues such as domestic violence and discrimination against women in the civil service, which opposition parties had not yet seriously pursued, appeared to render it a priority target in PAP cooption strategies in the early years of the NMP scheme. The articulate Soin did much to
give the NMP scheme credibility. She dominated parliamentary question time and occasionally shaped public debate, as in 1995 when she introduced a private member's bill -
The Family Violence Bill. Although this was defeated, Soin reflected that:
The media took up the subject of family violence in an earnest and responsible way and gave it a great deal of coverage, and this contributed to increased general awareness of the issue…Also the government made amendments to the Women's Charter and these incorporated many of the principles and concepts of the aborted Family Violence Bill. 28 Soin reasoned that, 'in Singapore's achievement-oriented society,' being a surgeon 'added a little more weight to what I had to say'. 29 However, she not only endorsed the NMP scheme in view of the existing limits to political space, but also declared that: 'Even if a bipartisan system should eventually evolve here, there will still be a role for non-partisan NMPs to add another perspective to issues'. Another of the few independent advocacy groups in Singapore, the Nature Society of Singapore (NSS), has also been recognized through the appointment of orthopedic surgeon Finally, nothing better illustrates how changing PAP perceptions of its own political challenges affects appointments than the category loosely referred to in Table 1 Rapidly-developing capitalism in Singapore had generated new issues and conflicts.
Amonst other things, these related to the effects of fuller exposure to globalization on different social and ethnic groups, the treatment of guest workers, the changing role and expectations of women inside and outside the workforce and concerns about the environment.
The PAP did not want this to create opportunities for the development of independent civil society organizations or opposition parties.
A key factor in the ability of the PAP to attract different notional representatives of target groups and sectors has been the absence of a domestic bourgeoisie and/or middle class seeking to challenge the state's economic, social or political dominance -whether motivated by democratic ideals or more self-serving material objectives. Consolidated control over the commanding heights of the domestic economy and the lead role in offshore investment by GLCs, most notably Temasek and the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation, has largely resigned domestic companies and professionals to strategies of riding on the coat-tails of state companies. 34 Meanwhile, the resources at the disposal of the PAP for punishment and reward have been bolstered so that access to jobs, contracts public housing and even superannuation is controlled through the PAP state, 35 further undermining the propensity and structural base for pockets of independent political space. In a theoretical sense, this point has some resonance with Brownlee's emphasis on the structural bases of coalitions sustaining authoritarian regimes, 36 although the argument here is that this needs to be extended beyond consideration of electoral politics.
Representation and NMPs
While Gandhi found little evidence of representation emanating from inclusive authoritarianism in her comprehensive study, 37 Phua also became an NMP against a background of heavy involvement in established organizations, although in her case grassroots sporting bodies. She sees herself as representing the sporting fraternity and advancing the opportunities and social benefits of sport -especially for youth. 41 The sporting and business fraternities were the two main supporters in her eight nomination letters to the Select Committee. Her essay submitted to the Committee was entitled 'The Average Woman of Singapore', emphasizing that she would be the only non-university graduate should she be appointed. In contrast with Khew, though, Phua indicated that she did not engage in any structured process for ascertaining the concerns and interests of the sporting fraternity but relied instead on a wealth of direct experience with those involved in sport. Thus far in Parliament, Phua has been closely disciplined to raising issues related to sport. However, she did speak on the controversial issue of ministerial salaries during that debate, which she explained many people had approached her about. 42 A theme evident in other responses was a claim not so much to representing a clearly defined constituency with whom some sort of structured or even unstructured engagement occurred, as a claim to be representing views and interests neglected by the political parties.
Geh Min, for example, did not hesitate to assert that she represents 'environmental issues and interests' and other issues neglected by the parties. 43 Technically, the Singapore Medical Association nominated Geh, but the nominees were fellow medical professionals Jennifer Lee and Kanwaljit Soin, friends with whom she had previously worked, among other things, on challenging female quotas for medical school entry. However, it was environmentalism that Geh championed in her application and during her term in Parliament she raised such issues as the illegal wildlife trade and animal rights. Although she was President of the NSS, she explained that she regularly received solicited and unsolicited feedback from members and her own network but there was no routine process of consultation with groups or individuals.
For Geh, the inability to seriously claim representation of identifiable constituents brought advantages and disadvantages. 'NMPs don't have any ground to stand on if they take a confrontational stance' observed Geh, since they weren't voted by an electorate. 44 By the same token: 'The luxury of being an NMP is bringing up issues that are relevant but won't win many votes, such as issues of interest to the NSS, which enjoys niche support'. 45 Goh Chong Chia, a professional architect who was also an NMP in the ninth Parliament, echoed this perspective. He had been nominated by a professional body and saw himself 'representing views not readily expressed in Parliament by either the PAP or the opposition,' emphasizing how 'NMPs are not beholden to anyone and are not seeking reelection from a constituency, they are at liberty to pursue those interests'. 46 Much like Geh,
Goh saw himself as having experiences and networks that could not be conceived of as constituencies, but which availed him of perspectives and information useful to Parliament. Two NMPs in the eleventh Parliament located in Table 1 under 'Youth', Siew Kum Hong and Eunice Olsen, have even less structured avenues for consulting any supposed
constituents. Yet Siew sees himself 'representing a specific segment of the populationyoung, late 20s, English-educated, western in outlook, fairly liberal, Internet savvy'. 47 Siew thinks the select Committee saw him 'representing the internet bloggers, the Mr Brown set'. 48 In his letter of application he did not purport to represent anyone, but he signalled helping people on low incomes, consumer rights, animal welfare, intellectual property and privacy as the issues of most concern to him. Yet in Parliament he has spoken on a wide range of issues, gaining most notoriety for introducing a petition with 2,341 signatures to repeal Penal Code 377A to decriminalize homosexuality. This was something that gay groups had lobbied him on. Olsen concedes that technically she cannot represent anybody but she nevertheless 'would like to represent the thoughts of the youth' in particular. She maintains that her role in the media and her music affords informal opportunities to gauge youth issues. 49 In practice,
she has spoken on a surprisingly diverse range of topics, including on GLC accountability. However, as with some other NMPs, Thio did not think she should be confined to the areas identified in her application and could exercise 'a roving commission'. 51 Thio made absolutely no claim to consulting anyone on the matters raised in Parliament and she has been true to her claims in both pursuing human rights issues and branching out to other topics. Soin's views on the scheme offering at least some opportunity for greater political engagement without the risks associated with formal political opposition may well be shared by other NMPs. However, a recurring theme from NMP interviews was the assertion that the scheme enabled issues to be raised that are not taken up with any seriousness, if at all, by political parties. Included here are environmentalism, feminism, gay rights, treatment of foreign workers, urban design and constitutional reform issues. These might be described as middle class or socially progressive issues, which neither the ruling party nor the opposition parties can easily embrace without risk of alienating the socially conservative Chinesespeaking working class, or so-called 'HDB Heartlanders.' So while the political timidity of the middle class is in itself a constraint, the building of alliances with the emerging middle class forces around some of the issues important to them has not been a priority for opposition parties. Consequently, these issues have been finding expression through the NMP scheme. Ironically, the technocratic approach to politics fostered by the PAP through the NMP scheme affords these issues legitimacy not readily available through the existing parties -even if that legitimacy hasn't translated into significant policy reform.
The gulf between some of the more socially progressive NMPs and the opposition parties was poignantly highlighted in the debate over the Penal Code (Amendment) Bill noted Low's failure to enter the debate, using it to bolster his argument that 'Chinesespeaking Singaporeans are not strongly engaged, either for removing section 377A or against removing section 377A'. 52 Indeed, arguably this particular episode revealed just how useful the NMP scheme can be for the PAP, providing a space for such debate without ever having to seriously entertain real change. It serves the PAP well that these issues are not embraced by the opposition, lest its failure to do likewise cost it middle class support.
To be sure, the difficulty of alliances between the expanding middle class and opposition parties do not rest principally on the above differences. Material redistribution to address social inequalities have historically been a key plank in the social democratic alliances across working and middle classes in other countries but the latter has shown little or no enthusiasm in Singapore for such an agenda. Crucially, the scope for this developing is not aided by the fragmentation and compartmentalization of political debate encouraged by the NMP scheme. First, the scheme promotes the idea of politics as a set of public policy choices, which obscures the fundamentally normative nature of politics -the recognition of which is more conducive to an acceptance of the need to develop alliances rather than rely solely on the logical power of argument to prevail. Second, through the NMP scheme the issues to be represented are not only, in effect, shaped by the Select Committee, but individuals and social organizations are drawn into a process of atomization as they each work away on their respective, specific agendas. For this reason, former NMP Goh Chong
Chia's hope that the scheme will prove 'a transitional institution, not an alternative to a civil society' appears optimistic. 53 Indeed, it is precisely the contribution of the NMP scheme in discouraging the formation of alliances between independent organizations in joint political action -outside PAP controlled institutions -that renders it most significant to the project of authoritarian renewal.
Conclusion
While many observers emphasize the absence of democratic transition in Singapore to highlight political continuity, there has been significant change to the regime to accommodate new social forces and contain tensions associated with the city-state's particular path of capitalist development. In this phase of authoritarianism, political participation is of heightened importance to the process by which contestation is obstructed. This includes new structures and notions of representation meant to limit politics to exercises in problem solving governance rather than more explicit debate and challenge over normative policy choices.
Importantly, the NMP scheme through which the PAP has most explicitly sought to develop new forms of representation to stymie political competition has met with a degree of acceptance -especially among business and professional classes generally denied opportunities for collective, independent political space. This must be understood in its political economy context, which is pivotal to the 'formula for successful and stable inclusionary authoritarianism' which Geddes observes as so generally elusive. 54 Consolidating state capitalism in Singapore has limited the scope for independent bases of power and shored up the resources of the PAP state and citizens' direct and indirect dependence on it. Meanwhile, the technocratic worldviews and assumptions of an ever-more powerful and increasingly homogenous class of politico-bureaucratic elites not only permeate and penetrate deep into existing institutions, but now also drive the direction of new ones.
Significantly, although the state capitalist trajectory of Singapore under the PAP is not a general feature of authoritarian rule, there are some points of intersection with the political economies of other countries in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. This includes the legacy of
Western support for repressive governments to shore up capitalism during the Cold War. This has meant that civil societies have often had to be built from low bases and in a context of late industrialization under globalized capitalism that has not been conducive to strong, independent trade unions linked to reformist political parties. Much contemporary middle class political activism is expressed, therefore, through NGOs rather than via broader social movements involving labour/middle class coalitions and is potentially vulnerable to other institutional alternatives, as in Singapore. Crucially, it is not just the choices of incumbent authoritarian elites that are shaped by political economy relationships, but the choices and modes of political opposition.
